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WELCOME TO THE MVSKOKE RESERVATION: MURPHY
V. ROYAL, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, AND RESERVATION
DIMINISHMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Calandra McCool*
By restoring the Muscogee Creek Nation to § 1151(a) Indian Country
status, Murphy v. Royal1 expanded the Muscogee Creek Nation’s rights to
prosecute, regulate, and adjudicate cases pertaining to or involving
American Indians 2 or Alaska Natives within its reservation. While the
Tenth Circuit’s denial of en banc review for Murphy caused a stir, the
jurisdictional impacts that the State of Oklahoma fears are minimal because
the case primarily impacts Native Americans or transactions with Native
Americans. Subsequently, Murphy should be upheld because it primarily
decreases state jurisdiction for cases involving Indian persons and entities,
rather than non-Indians, much of which was already within the Muscogee
Creek Nation’s jurisdiction. As a result, there is little change to the judicial
expectation of the non-Indians living in the area.
This Comment offers an understanding of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Murphy, as well as the impacts the case might have on the residents of the
Muscogee Creek Nation. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of
the types of Indian Country and the Indian canons of construction. Part II
discusses reservation diminishment cases leading up to Murphy, including
relevant Tenth Circuit precedent. Part III examines Murphy, with an
emphasis on the Tenth Circuit’s application of the Solem v. Bartlett3 test.
Part IV analyzes how Murphy impacts federal, tribal, and state criminal
jurisdiction in the Muscogee Creek Nation. Part V considers the impacts of
Murphy on civil regulatory jurisdiction. Part VI examines how Murphy
changes civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. Part VII revisits the actual impacts
* 3rd year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017) (cert. granted sub nom. Royal v. Murphy, docket no.
17-1107).
2. The terms “Native American,” “Indian,” “American Indian,” and “tribal/tribe(s)”
are used interchangeably in this Comment. It is well established that Indians prefer to be
identified by a tribe that they are a member of first, followed by all other terms.
Nevertheless, when discussing federal Indian law, the scope and applicability is often broad,
making specification of a single tribe difficult. Therefore, general terms will be utilized here.
Additionally, the Muscogee Creek Nation may be referred to as the Creek Nation in some
historical quotations.
3. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
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of the Muscogee Creek Nation’s expanded jurisdiction and highlights the
case’s appellate progression. 4
I. Relevant Indian Law Doctrines and Statutes
This section will briefly address relevant areas of federal Indian law that
inform and shape the outcome in Murphy. These areas include: the Indian
law canons of construction and the reserved rights doctrine; the statutory
types of Indian Country; diminishment and disestablishment jurisprudence;
and precedential Tenth Circuit cases about the Muscogee Creek Nation.
Covering these topics is necessary to fully understand the outcome of
Murphy and why changing the statutorily-defined types of Indian Country
impacts jurisdiction.
A. The Indian Law Canons of Construction and the Reserved Rights
Doctrine
The Indian law canons of construction are a set of foundational
interpretive theories unique to Indian law. The first canon requires that
“treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed
in favor of the Indians.”5 The second canon expands on the first, stating that
“all ambiguities are to be resolved” in favor of the Indians. 6 Third, all such
treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders “are to be construed as
the Indians would have understood them” at the time of their negotiation or
passage.7 Sometimes the first and second canons are combined into one,
and, as in the 2012 edition of Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
the reserved rights doctrine is included among the canons as opposed to
being viewed as a separate doctrine. 8 The reserved rights doctrine states that
4. In order to limit the scope of this Comment, I will not address the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) claims present in Murphy. The habeas case law
implicated by that analysis would make both the length and breadth of this Comment too
unwieldy. Additionally, the AEDPA claims are less relevant to federal Indian law
jurisprudence than other aspects of the case.
5. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1], at 113 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN].
6. Id.; see also Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976) (“[W]e must be guided
by that ‘eminently sound and vital canon’ that ‘statutes passed for the benefit of dependent
Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor
of the Indians.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S.
649, 655 n.7 (1976), and Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
7. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[1], at 114; see also Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct.
1072, 1079 (2016).
8. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[1], at 114.
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“tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.”9 In other words, tribes
retain all rights they had at the time they entered into negotiations with the
United States unless they were expressly ceded.
The Indian law canons of construction are essential to the analysis of
Murphy. The canons shape the Tenth Circuit’s deference to tribes through
the court’s application of the Solem test, which is used to determine
diminishment or disestablishment of a reservation, and the court’s
application of the canons to all of the documents analyzed by the federal
courts in Murphy. Subsequently, the deference given to Native Americans
by federal courts serves as an invaluable tool for Petitioner-Appellant
Murphy and by extension the Muscogee Creek Nation during the ongoing
appellate process.
B. Types of “Indian Country” – 18 U.S.C. § 1151
The statute most important to understanding tribal jurisdiction is 18
U.S.C. § 1151, which defines “Indian Country.” This section delineates
where concurrent federal and tribal jurisdiction may exist, to the exclusion
of the states, for both criminal and civil claims where there is at least one
Indian party.10 Under § 1151, there are three different types of Indian
Country, including:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same. 11
The first type, § 1151(a) Indian Country, defines intact (as opposed to
disestablished) reservations as those where tribal and federal jurisdiction
coexist over all land within the bounds of that reservation, regardless of its
owner’s Indian status or the fee status of the land. 12 This section defines the
9.
10.
(1975).
11.
12.

Id.
E.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
Id.
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legal status of most reservations, including the typical reservation of the
American popular imagination. These are reservations that have not been
disestablished but may have been reduced in size through a process known
as diminishment. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
Muscogee Creek Nation possessed this type of jurisdiction within the
boundaries of the 1866 treaty.13
The second category, § 1151(b) Indian Country, defines “dependent
Indian communities.”14 This category arises from the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Sandoval, where the Court held that although
the Pueblos held their land in fee since their time under Spanish
subjugation, they needed protection from the onslaught of American
westward expansion much like the rest of the tribes. 15 The Court declared
the resulting communities as “dependent Indian communities,” which share
complete jurisdiction with the federal government. 16 Pueblos are the typical
example of § 1151(b) Indian Country, though there have been other
applications of that category of Indian Country jurisdiction to offreservation tribal trusts or restricted title holdings.17 While case law
indicates there could be § 1151(b) jurisdiction for off-reservation tribal
property held in trust, that line of argumentation faced opposition in the
Tenth Circuit.18
Lastly, § 1151(c) Indian Country applies to Indian allotments, including
those within the boundaries of diminished and disestablished reservations. 19
Commonly seen in Oklahoma, § 1151(c) Indian Country gives tribes and
the federal government jurisdiction over land currently held in restricted
Indian fee or trust by the federal government on behalf of either tribes or
individual Indians, regardless of whether it is within an § 1151(a)
reservation. Unlike § 1151(a) Indian Country, § 1151(c) does not rely on
reservation boundaries, but instead relies on the title of the land.20 This is
the type of Indian Country that most commonly leads to the infamous
“checkerboard jurisdiction” problem, where § 1151(c) Indian Country
parcels are scattered across a wide area of unrestricted fee land, especially
13. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 937-38 (10th Cir. 2017); see Treaty with the
Creeks, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
15. 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][iii], at 193-94.
17. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][iii], at 193-96.
18. See generally Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).
20. Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[2][c][iv], at 197.
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on disestablished reservations. The State of Oklahoma presumed that the
Muscogee Creek Nation had § 1151(c) land in Murphy v. State of
Oklahoma.21
II. Diminishment and Disestablishment
The body of case law addressing the reduction of tribal land base and
jurisdiction is referred to as either the diminishment or disestablishment
cases. The definition provided in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey clarifies the
difference between the two: “Although the terms ‘diminished’ and
‘disestablished’ have at times been used interchangeably, disestablishment
generally refers to the relatively rare elimination of a reservation while
diminishment commonly refers to the reduction in size of a reservation”
that occurred at some point in history. 22 Disestablished reservations
typically have § 1151(c) Indian Country jurisdiction over tribally-owned
lands, as well as trust or restricted Indian title lands. Diminished
reservations, on the other hand, can have any type of § 1151 jurisdiction.
A. Who Has the Power to Diminish or Disestablish Reservations?
Congress is granted the majority of the formal power to deal with Indians
through the Indian Commerce Clause, the modern “treaty” process, and
various Supreme Court decisions.23 In United States v. Kagama, the Court
held that because of tribal dealings and treaties with the United States, the
tribe had been rendered dependent on the United States due to the growth of
its power.24 The Court also stated that “[f]rom [tribes’] very weakness and
helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.” 25
The power so described is congressional plenary authority over Indian
affairs, including the power to abrogate treaties.26
In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court explained that this
plenary authority also gives Congress the extra-constitutional, unilateral
power to change and terminate the Indian Country status of land, thereby
giving Congress the power to change the type of jurisdiction applicable to

21. 2005 OK CR 25, ¶ 47, 124 P.3d 1198, 1207.
22. 188 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. After the U.S. House of Representatives expressed
displeasure over not having a role in Indian negotiations, Congress passed the Act of Mar. 3,
1871, ch. 106, 16 Stat. 471. Congress has since negotiated Indian statutes in lieu of treaties.
24. 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
25. Id. at 384.
26. Id.
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that land.27 Subsequently, “the Supreme Court has said the ‘touchstone’ of
whether a reservation’s boundaries have been altered is congressional
purpose.”28 The explanation of congressional plenary power included in
Yankton contributed to the design of the dispositive test found in Solem,
which is used to determine reservation disestablishment.
B. Solem v. Bartlett: The Diminishment and Disestablishment Test
In Solem v. Bartlett, the Supreme Court was faced with another habeas
case pertaining to whether a reservation had been diminished or
disestablished, this time involving a man appealing his ten-year sentence in
South Dakota.29 The reservation at issue was the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation.30 The question before the Court was whether the 1908
Cheyenne River Act diminished the boundaries of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation, rendering the locus of the crime outside of the Tribe’s §
1151(a) Indian Country; or, whether the Act merely allowed for non-Indian
settlement on the reservation, preserving the land’s status as Indian
Country. 31 Because the Supreme Court believed “[t]he effect of any given
surplus land act depends on the language of the act and the circumstances
underlying its passage,” the Court delineated a three-part test for
disestablishment and diminishment to distinguish “surplus land acts that
diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered non-Indians the
opportunity to purchase land within established reservation boundaries.” 32
First, the Court declared that “[d]iminishment . . . will not be lightly
inferred”: “Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and
no matter what happens to the title of the individual plots within the area,
the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly
indicates otherwise.”33 The Court then indicated that
[t]he most probative evidence of congressional intent is the
statutory language used to open the Indian lands. Explicit
reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and
27. 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998) (“Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs,
including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights.”); see also COHEN, supra note 5, §
3.04[3], at 198-99.
28. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 918 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Yankton, 522 U.S. at
343).
29. 465 U.S. 463, 464-66 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 464-66 (citing Cheyenne River Act, ch. 218, 35 Stat. 460 (1908)).
32. Id. at 469, 470.
33. Id. at 470.
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total surrender of all tribal interests strongly suggests that
Congress meant to divest from the reservation all unallotted
opened lands.34
Further, if any language fitting the prior description is present in
conjunction with an “unconditional commitment” to compensate a tribe for
any unallotted land, “there is an almost insurmountable presumption that
Congress meant for the tribe’s reservation to be diminished.” 35
The second Solem factor considers evidence of contemporaneous debates
and negotiations surrounding the surplus land act, looking specifically for
evidence that “unequivocally reveal[s] a widely-held, contemporaneous
understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result of the
proposed legislation.”36 This second factor gives weight to the historical
events surrounding the negotiations of a given treaty or statute. Examples of
this type of evidence include contemporaneous legislative history,
newspaper articles, and other types of historical record data. Prior to Solem,
the Supreme Court allowed evidence under this category to prove
congressional intent to diminish; since Solem, the second factor alone is
insufficient to prove congressional intent. 37
The third and last factor considers events occurring “after the passage of
a surplus land act” as ancillary evidence of congressional intent and
includes evidence such as “Congress’s own treatment of the affected areas,”
as well as “the manner in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs and local
judicial authorities dealt with unallotted open areas.”38 Further, the Court
considers the demographics of the affected area as evidence that “[w]here
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the
area has long since lost its Indian character, . . . de facto, if not de jure,
diminishment may have occurred.”39 The third factor is the least persuasive,
and “[w]hen both an act and its legislative history”—or the first two parts
of the test—“fail to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a
congressional intention to diminish Indian lands, [courts] are bound by
[their] traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment
34. Id.
35. Id. at 470-71.
36. Id. at 471.
37. See generally Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); cf. Osage Nation
v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (post-Solem Tenth Circuit decision) (relying almost
entirely on second factor evidence to find disestablishment of the Osage Nation
Reservation).
38. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
39. Id.
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did not take place . . ..”40 Thus, the Court held that if the first and second
factors both fail, the third factor also fails due to the requirements in the
Indian canons of construction that statutes and treaties be liberally
construed in favor of Native Americans and that ambiguities be interpreted
in favor of the Native Americans.41
Solem also established that there is a presumption against
disestablishment. 42 Subsequently, congressional intent to diminish or
disestablish a reservation must be “clear and plain.” 43 This presumption
supports the primacy of the first factor of the Solem test. In summary, the
three-factor Solem test is the standard by which federal courts determine
whether Congress intended to diminish or disestablish an Indian
reservation.
C. Key Diminishment Cases After Solem
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on several
diminishment/disestablishment cases since Solem, the most important of
which are Hagen v. Utah and Nebraska v. Parker.44 In both of these cases,
the Court applied the Solem test to determine whether the reservation at
issue had been diminished or disestablished. The continual application of
the Solem test by the Supreme Court supports the Tenth Circuit’s finding in
Murphy that the Solem test is the governing law for diminishment and
disestablishment cases. These cases also shape the Tenth Circuit’s
application of the Solem test.
1. Hagen v. Utah
Ten years after its initial decision in Solem, the Supreme Court applied
the Solem test in Hagen v. Utah.45 In Hagen, the Court found that Congress
had diminished the Uintah Indian Reservation, meaning the locus of the
case at bar was not in Indian Country. 46 When applying the first Solem
factor, the Court noted that it has “never required any particular form of
words” to prove congressional intent to diminish or disestablish an Indian

40. Id. at 472.
41. COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02[1], at 113-14.
42. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71, 481; see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[3], at 199.
43. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343 (1998).
44. The other case of note, Yankton, 522 U.S. 329, also applies the Solem test but is not
particularly distinctive in its argumentation or result.
45. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
46. Id. at 421-22.
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reservation.47 As such, the acts that restored surplus Uintah Reservation
lands to the public domain for a lump compensatory sum sufficiently
evidenced congressional intent to diminish the reservation, satisfying the
dispositive first factor of the Solem test.48
The Court then affirmed their conclusion with additional support from
the second and third factors of the Solem test. When considering
contemporaneous historical evidence, the Court emphasized how the
relevant actions of both Congress and the Secretary of the Interior tracked
the coincidental increase in congressional plenary power over Indian tribes
and how that increase in power cemented congressional approval to open
the surplus Uintah lands. 49 Finally, applying the third factor, the Court
contrasted the facts in Hagen with the facts in Solem by evidencing the nonIndian character of the diminished Uintah lands. 50
2. Nebraska v. Parker
In 2016, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed their support of the
Solem test in Nebraska v. Parker.51 Based on the lack of any congressional
intent to diminish or disestablish the Omaha Reservation, the Court held
that the reservation remained intact. 52 Most importantly, the Court refused
to apply the third Solem factor and did not allow demographics alone to
refute the fact that the statutory language failed to satisfy the dispositive
first Solem factor.53
The Court reiterated that the first factor of the “well settled” Solem test
requires demonstrating the existence of some evidence of clear intent to
diminish a given reservation. These factors include: “[e]xplicit reference[s]
to cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of
all tribal interests;”54 “an unconditional commitment from Congress to
compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land,” which, if provided in a
lump sum payment along with explicit cession language, creates “an almost
insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the tribe’s reservation
to be diminished;”55 or, alternatively, “[a] statutory provision restoring
47. Id. at 411.
48. Id. at 414.
49. Id. at 416-20.
50. Id. at 420-21.
51. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
52. Id. at 1082.
53. COHEN, supra note 5, § 3.04[3] (Supp. 2017).
54. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1079 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984))
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
55. Id.
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portions of the reservation to ‘the public domain’ [to] signif[y]
diminishment.”56 The Court then succinctly found the surplus land act in
question did not indicate congressional intent to diminish or disestablish the
Omaha Reservation, and thus failed the first factor of the Solem test. 57
Because the first factor failed, the Court upheld post-Solem precedent and
refused to allow evidence from the second or third factors to be
dispositive. 58 Even if the Court allowed this evidence, the second factor also
failed because the contemporaneous legislative history did not provide any
evidence of an intent to diminish.59
What distinguishes Parker from other post-Solem disestablishment cases
is that the Court upheld Solem and refused to allow the third factor to be
dispositive when asked to consider extensive third-factor evidence of
disestablishment. The consideration of the demographic and federal
treatment evidence allowed by the third Solem factor indicated a clear
absence of a strong Omaha presence in the area for decades. 60 Nevertheless,
the Court refused to overrule Solem and allow the federal and Nebraskan
governments to have jurisdiction because it is not the Court’s role to
“‘rewrite’ the 1882 Act61 in light of this subsequent demographic history,”
or to overvalue the “limited interpretive value” of subsequent federal
treatment of the lands in question. 62
D. Precedential Cases on the Status of Muscogee Creek Nation Indian
Country
Two Tenth Circuit cases also inform the court’s analysis in Murphy:
Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma and Osage Nation v. Irby. Indian
Country, U.S.A. is a prior decision in which the Tenth Circuit discussed the
Muscogee Creek Nation’s reservation’s lands as § 1151(a) lands rather than
as § 1151(c) trust land, which ultimately laid groundwork for its decision in
Murphy. Osage Nation is a disestablishment case in which the court moved
away from the Supreme Court’s post-Solem precedent and ruled that the
Osage Nation’s reservation had been disestablished based primarily on
contemporaneous legislative history found under the second Solem factor.
56. Id. (quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 414 (1994)).
57. Id. at 1079-80.
58. Id. at 1080-82.
59. Id. at 1080.
60. Id. at 1081.
61. The 1882 Act enabled the Secretary of the Interior to sell part of the Omaha
reservation for “use by the Sioux City and Nebraska Railroad Company.” See id. at 1077.
62. Id. at 1082.
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1. Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma
In Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit held that “the
Creek Reservation continues to exist, at least in some form.”63 The Tenth
Circuit in Murphy noted that while diminishment was not at issue when
deciding Indian Country, U.S.A., the court had decided that the “site at
issue was ‘part of the original treaty lands still held by the Creek
Nation . . . . These lands historically were considered Indian country and
still retain their reservation status within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
1151(a).’”64 This language from Indian Country, U.S.A. indicates that the
Tenth Circuit had begun to consider the Muscogee Creek Nation as §
1151(a) Indian Country as early as 1987.65
2. Osage Nation v. Irby
The State of Oklahoma relied heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Osage Nation v. Irby66 for its argument against the continued existence of
the Muscogee Creek Nation reservation in Murphy. In Osage, the Tenth
Circuit found the statutes in question to be ambiguous; therefore, the first
factor of the Solem test was not conclusive. 67 Subsequently, the Tenth
Circuit moved to the second Solem factor, finding clear legislative history
supporting the conclusion that all parties knew and understood the Osage
Allotment Act disestablished the Osage Reservation.68 In regard to the
second factor, the court cited historical evidence pertaining to how the
Osage Allotment Act was negotiated, which “reflect[ed] clear congressional
intent and Osage understanding that the reservation would be
disestablished.”69 In regard to the third factor, the Tenth Circuit stated that
the demographic shift after the Allotment Act supported the determination
that the reservation had been disestablished. 70 Thus, despite no clear
evidence of congressional intent to diminish the Osage Reservation as
required by the first Solem factor, the Tenth Circuit broke with the Supreme
Court’s post-Solem precedent and concluded that the Osage Reservation
had been disestablished based primarily on evidence from the second factor
63. Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 937 (10th Cir. 2017) (discussing Indian Country,
U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987)).
64. Id. (quoting Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d at 976).
65. See generally Indian Country, U.S.A., 829 F.2d 967.
66. 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010).
67. Id. at 1123-24.
68. Id. at 1124 (discussing the Osage Allotment Act, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1127.
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of the Solem test.71 This ruling is alarming because if the Supreme Court
were to find the second factor dispositive like the Tenth Circuit did here,
the usefulness of the Solem test as a tool for protecting tribal land bases
would significantly diminish.
III. Murphy v. Royal
A. Facts of the Case
Petitioner-Appellant Patrick Dwayne Murphy resided with Patsy Jacobs
in August 1999.72 Ms. Jacobs had a child, George Jr., from a prior
relationship with the victim, George Jacobs. 73 Murphy and Ms. Jacobs had
an argument concerning Mr. Jacobs, resulting in threats from Murphy that
he was “‘going to get’ Mr. Jacobs and his family.”74 On the day of the
crime, Mr. Jacobs was intoxicated and passed out in the back of his cousin,
Mark Sumka’s, truck when they drove past Murphy and his two
passengers.75 Both vehicles stopped, and though Murphy told Sumka “to
turn off the car,” Sumka drove away. 76 Murphy chased Sumka and forced
Sumka’s car off the road. 77 Murphy got out of his car and a fistfight ensued
between the five men, during which Sumka fled the scene. 78 He returned to
the scene of the fight five minutes later to find Murphy throwing a knife
into the woods and Mr. Jacobs lying in a ditch “barely breathing.” 79
Mr. Jacobs was found later in the same ditch “with his face bloodied and
slashes across his chest and stomach.” 80 Additionally, Mr. Jacobs’s genitals
were severed before he was dragged from the roadway to the ditch where
his throat and chest were cut.81 Murphy confessed to Ms. Jacobs upon
returning to her home that he murdered Mr. Jacobs. 82 The State
subsequently charged Murphy with the first-degree murder of Mr. Jacobs
and sought the death penalty. 83
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1126-28.
Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 904 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Relevant Procedural History84
A jury convicted Petitioner-Appellant Murphy of first-degree murder in
2000 in McIntosh County and sentenced him to death, partly due to the
aggravating circumstances of the crime. 85 Murphy’s conviction was
affirmed twice, once in May of 2002, and again in March of 2003, on a
direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). 86
His second application to the State of Oklahoma for post-conviction
relief alleged that, among other things, “Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction
because the Major Crimes Act gives the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute murders committed by Indians in Indian
country.”87 In the resulting evidentiary hearing, Mr. Murphy argued the
crime occurred in § 1151 Indian Country under all three subtypes. 88 The
state court concluded that there was only state jurisdiction, not § 1151(c)
Indian allotment land tribal jurisdiction, over the crime. 89 The state court
did not determine if there was § 1151(a) reservation or § 1151(b) dependent
Indian community jurisdiction, despite the OCCA’s request for it to do so. 90
From that initial state court decision, Murphy “appealed to the OCCA,”
which “denied relief on his jurisdictional . . . claims but granted limited
relief on the Atkins claim” that pertained to whether Murphy was mentally
competent to be executed.91 With respect to the jurisdictional issue, the
OCCA did not agree with the state district court’s conclusion pertaining to
the ownership of the road and the easement alongside of it, but upheld the
finding that state jurisdiction was proper and that Murphy had shown
insufficient evidence to prove the land in question was § 1151(a) or §
1151(b) Indian Country. 92
After losing on his jurisdictional claim before the state, Murphy
amended his federal habeas petition on December 28, 2005, to include that
claim. 93 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma

84. For the complete procedural history, including extensive coverage of the habeas
proceedings, see id. at 905-11.
85. Id. at 905
86. Id. at 905-06.
87. Id. at 907.
88. Id. at 907-08.
89. Id. at 908.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 908-09.
93. Id. at 910.
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rejected all of his claims on August 1, 2007.94 In this application, Mr.
Murphy’s jurisdictional claim only argued that the crime occurred either on
§ 1151(a) reservation land or § 1151(c) Indian allotment land, leaving out
the § 1151(b) dependent Indian community argument. 95 The Eastern
District of Oklahoma ruled that “the OCCA’s decisions against Mr. Murphy
on these theories were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application
of clearly established federal law” under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).96 Nevertheless, the Eastern District issued
Murphy “three certificates of appealability (‘COAs’).” 97
After a prolonged Atkins mental capacity appeal process, the Tenth
Circuit granted the jurisdictional certificate of appealability sua sponte. 98
On August 8, 2017, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the State of Oklahoma did
not have jurisdiction over the prosecution because the Muscogee Creek
Nation had not been disestablished; instead, the reservation remained
intact.99 On November 9, 2017, the Tenth Circuit denied Oklahoma’s
petition for en banc review, with “no judge on the original panel or the en
banc court request[ing] that a poll be called.” 100
C. Legal Analysis
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis in Murphy dealt with three cumulative
issues. First, the court addressed “[w]hether there was clearly established
federal law as determined by the Supreme Court when the OCCA addressed
Mr. Murphy’s jurisdictional claim.” 101 Second, the court examined
“[w]hether the OCCA rendered a decision contrary to this clearly
established law when it resolved Mr. Murphy’s jurisdictional claim.” 102
Third, the court considered “[w]hether the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Murphy’s case.” 103 To briefly answer the
three issues, the Tenth Circuit found that Solem was clearly established law

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2012)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 911.
99. Id. at 966.
100. Id. at 901.
101. Id. at 921.
102. Id. Because the second issue pertains to the AEDPA analysis, it will not be
addressed in this Comment.
103. Id.
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when Murphy was originally decided.104 Thus, the court found that the
OCCA’s decisions were contrary to clearly established law because not
only did it not consider the Solem test in its approach, but its approach was
incompatible with the Solem test.105 Finally, the Tenth Circuit applied the
Solem framework to the applicable treaties and statutes between the
Muscogee Creek Nation and the United States to find the reservation still
exists.106 As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that the federal government had
exclusive jurisdiction over Murphy’s case because the crime occurred in
Indian Country.107
D. First Issue: Whether the Solem Test Is Clearly Established Federal Law
The first issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit disposes of whether the
Solem test qualified as clearly established law in 2005. The Tenth Circuit
held that the test was clearly established law and had been treated as such in
numerous Supreme Court decisions since the case was decided in 1984. 108
To support its decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court,
along with a lengthy list of federal circuit and district courts, continued to
apply the Solem test in subsequent decisions spanning from the mid-1980s
until the 2005 OCCA decision.109 Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit held that
Solem provided the governing test when the OCCA decided in 2005
whether the Muscogee Creek Nation had been disestablished. 110
E. Second Issue: Whether Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Is Proper
The Tenth Circuit then applied the Solem framework to the unique
history surrounding the Muscogee Creek Nation reservation. In order for
the State of Oklahoma to successfully prove disestablishment under the
Solem test, it had to first show unequivocal statutory evidence of
congressional intent to disestablish the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek
Nation.111 While both contemporaneous historical evidence and present
demographic evidence can support the first Solem factor, current Supreme
Court jurisprudence holds that the latter two portions of the Solem test are
104. Id. at 921-23.
105. Id. at 926-28.
106. Id. at 937-48.
107. Id. at 966.
108. Id. at 921-23.
109. Id. For examples of Supreme Court cases, see generally South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
110. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 922-23 (noting the Supreme Court’s recognition that a “legal
framework for evaluating a given type of claim can constitute clearly established law”).
111. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-72 (1984).
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insufficient to prove disestablishment or diminishment without the first. 112
The Tenth Circuit, however, does allow for the second Solem factor to
prove disestablishment if the contemporaneous historical evidence
incontrovertibly supports mutual understanding of the intent to disestablish
the reservation.113
1. The First Solem Factor
The State of Oklahoma argued the “collective weight of eight different
laws enacted between 1893 and 1906”—as opposed to express language of
cession, a lump sum payment, or reference to returning the land to the
public domain—proved congressional intent to diminish the Muscogee
Creek Nation.114 Nevertheless, the court found that none of the statutes
satisfied the first factor of the Solem test.115
The Tenth Circuit addressed each statute in chronological order,
beginning with the Act of March 3, 1893. The law in question was an
appropriations act that also “gave ‘the consent of the United States’ to the
allotment of lands ‘within the limits of the country occupied by the
Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and [S]eminoles.’” 116 The court
noted, however, that this Act merely established the Dawes Commission
and did not make any determination on the continued existence of the
Muscogee Creek reservation. 117
The Act of June 10, 1896, was likewise unpersuasive, as it once again
merely appropriated funds for treaty negotiation with the Muscogee Creek
Nation and provided instructions to the Dawes Commission “for the
purpose of ‘rectify[ing] the many inequalities and discriminations’ in the
[Indian] Territory and ‘afford[ing] needful protection to the lives and
property of all citizens and residents thereof.’” 118
The third appropriations act cited by the State changed federal and tribal
jurisdiction in the Indian Territory by granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
United States.119 It also made all legislation by the Five Tribes subject to

112. Id.
113. See generally Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2010).
114. Murphy, 875 F.3d at 938.
115. Id. at 938-39.
116. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 15, 27 Stat. 612, 645)
(alternation in original).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 940 (quoting Act of June 10, 1896, ch. 398, 29 Stat. 321, 340) (first and third
alterations in original).
119. Id. at 940-41 (citing Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62).
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the President of the United States’ veto power. 120 Nevertheless, the Act of
June 7, 1897, did not disestablish the Muscogee Creek Reservation.121
As its fourth supporting statute, the State proffered the Curtis Act. The
Curtis Act abolished tribal courts, declared tribal law unenforceable, and
transferred all tribal court cases to the federal court within the Indian
Territory.122 Federal payments were then dispersed to individual tribal
members instead of tribes.123 Finally, the Curtis Act included a default
allotment plan and a proposed allotment plan for the Creeks; however, the
Muscogee Creek Nation refused to ratify it and negotiated its own allotment
agreement with the United States later. 124 Nevertheless, despite the fact that
the Curtis Act reshaped governance in the Indian Territory, it did not
change the borders of the Muscogee Creek Nation. 125
The Muscogee Creek Nation negotiated its own individual allotment
agreement which specified that it superseded any “conflicting federal
statutes.” 126 The Original Allotment Agreement of 1901 addressed four
different issues: (1) general allotment, (2) town sites, (3) tribally-held lands,
and (4) future Creek governance over areas within their borders.127
The Agreement provided that aside from those lands reserved for either
tribal or town purposes, all Creek lands were to be “appraised and allotted
among the citizens of the tribe” deemed eligible based on the tribal
citizenship rolls. 128 Each Muscogee Creek citizen “would receive an
allotment of 160 acres valued at $6.50 per acre.”129 Each allotment
transferred “all right, title and interest of the Creek Nation and of all other
citizens in and to the lands embraced in [the] allotment certificate” in
exchange for that allottee’s consent to allotment and relinquishment of any
claims to other Creek lands.130 While the Creek citizens received their
allotments in fee, the Secretary of the Interior still had to approve most
120. Id. at 941 (citing 30 Stat. at 84).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Curtis Act, ch. 517, §§ 26, 28, 30 Stat. 495, 504-05 (1898)).
123. Id. (citing Curtis Act § 19, 30 Stat. at 502).
124. Id. (citing Curtis Act § 11, 30 Stat. at 497-98).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement, ch. 676, ¶¶ 41, 44, 31 Stat. 861, 872
(1901)).
127. Id. at 941-44.
128. Id. at 941-42 (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶¶ 2-3, 31 Stat. at 862-63)
(internal quotations omitted).
129. Id. at 942 (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 3, 31 Stat. at 862).
130. Id. (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 23, 31 Stat. at 868) (internal
quotations omitted) (alteration in original).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

372

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

encumbrances or alienations of their allotments, resulting in the type of
Indian title known as restricted Indian fee. 131 Additional restrictions
applied, as well. 132
Any surplus lands were to be used, along with any funds from preceding
treaties, “for the purpose of equalizing allotment[]” values for those tribal
members who received less valuable tracts of land. 133 If a tribal member
received an allotment worth more than the baseline value, then the
difference could be charged against other entitlements the tribal member
had right to claim. 134
Town sites and tribal use lands were exempted from the general
allotment provision. Towns of more than 200 residents were “surveyed, laid
out, and appraised” before town commissions sold lots “for the benefit of
the tribe.”135 Per the statute, “‘[a]ny person,’ not just Creek citizens, ‘in
rightful possession of any town lot having improvements thereon’” had
right of first refusal.136 The town commission auctioned off unimproved lots
within a year of the appraisal.137 At their option, the Creeks also reserved
lands for tribal purposes, such as “Creek schools and orphan homes;
cemeteries; a university; Creek courthouses, and churches and schools
outside of towns.”138 If these properties ever fell into disuse, the act
provided for auctioning them off to Creek citizens only.139
Lastly, the Original Allotment Agreement provided the roles of both
tribal and federal government, at least temporarily, in the newly allotted
Muscogee Creek Nation.140 Creek governmental authority, though limited,
did persist in the form of “legislative authority over both unallotted tribal
lands and allotted lands” and numerous other functions.141 While the
Original Allotment Act envisioned continuing tribal authority as temporary,
Congress negated the tribal government dissolution provision in the Act

131. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 7, 31 Stat. at 863-64).
132. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 37, 31 Stat. at 871).
133. Id. (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 9, 31 Stat. at 864).
134. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 3, 31 Stat. at 862-63).
135. Id. at 943 (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 10, 31 Stat. at 864, 865)
(internal quotations omitted).
136. Id. (quoting Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 11, 31 Stat. at 866).
137. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 14, 31 Stat. at 866).
138. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 24(c)-(p), 31 Stat. at 868-69) (citations
omitted).
139. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 24, 31 Stat. at 869).
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶ 42, 31 Stat. at 872).
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before the Muscogee Creek government ever dissolved. 142 Meanwhile, the
United States assumed some powers that pertained directly to the
movement of certain types of commercial and tax activities across the
Creek Nation borders.143 In sum, not only is there no evidence of
disestablishment, but the Original Allotment Agreement repeatedly
reaffirmed the borders of the Creek Nation. 144
The Supplemental Allotment Agreement, Oklahoma’s sixth supporting
document, primarily served as a set of clarifications for the Original
Allotment Agreement. 145 Most relevant to the present case is the fact that
the Supplemental Agreement renewed the anti-encumbrance and alienation
provisions as well as clarified the lease restrictions. 146 No provision in the
Supplemental Agreement addressed the Muscogee Creek borders beyond
recognizing them. 147
Shortly after Congress reauthorized the continued existence of the Creek
government on March 2, 1906—two days before statutory dissolution—it
enacted the Five Tribes Act, which recognized the indefinite existence of
the Creek Government while further restricting its power.148 Most
importantly, the new restrictions gave the Secretary of the Interior the
power “to sell unallotted lands not otherwise provided for and deposit the
proceeds into the Treasury for the Tribe’s benefit.”149 The Tenth Circuit
agreed that this Act also did not disestablish the Creek Reservation. 150
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit considered the Oklahoma Enabling Act. The
Enabling Act “granted permission to the inhabitants of both the Territory of
Oklahoma and the Indian Territory to adopt a constitution and seek
admittance into the Union as the State of Oklahoma.”151 In the Enabling
Act, Congress explicitly prohibited the state constitution from in any way
“limit[ing] or impair[ing] the rights of person or property pertaining to the
Indians of said Territories” or to give the power to do so to the United
States.152 The Tenth Circuit, reiterating its analysis from Osage Nation,
142. Id. at 944.
143. Id. (citing Original Allotment Agreement ¶¶ 37-38, 31 Stat. at 871).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 944-45.
146. Id. at 945 (citing Supplemental Allotment Agreement, ch. 1323, ¶ 16, 32 Stat. 500,
503 (1902)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 945-46.
149. Id. at 946 (citing Five Tribes Act, ch. 1876, § 16, 34 Stat. 137, 143 (1906)).
150. Id. at 947.
151. Id. (citing Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, § 1, 34 Stat. 267, 267-68 (1906)).
152. Id.
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once again found that the Oklahoma Enabling Act did not “contain [any]
express termination language.153
After analyzing all eight statutes the State proffered to satisfy the first
Solem factor, the Tenth Circuit provided three reasons why these statutes
failed to disestablish the Muscogee Creek Reservation. 154 First, “the statutes
lack[ed] any of the textual ‘hallmarks’ demonstrating congressional intent
to disestablish, and no other language show[ed] Congress altered the Creek
Reservation’s boundaries.”155 Second, “specific statutory language—‘[t]he
most probative evidence of congressional intent’—shows Congress
continued to recognize the Reservation’s borders.” 156 Lastly, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that “the State’s reliance on the statutes’ reforms of title
and governance arrangements within the Reservation [was] unavailing
because these changes did not disestablish the Reservation.”157
The absence of any “hallmark” language of intended disestablishment in
all of these statutes is the strongest evidence against disestablishment.
Before listing numerous examples, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that “[t]he
absence of such language is notable because Congress is fully capable of
stating its intention to disestablish or diminish a reservation.”158 Further, the
court noted that Congress went so far as to clearly delineate the boundaries
of the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation in several of the Acts cited by
the State of Oklahoma.159 While no magic phrase is required to prove
congressional intent to diminish, the court found no statutory language,
“whatever it may be,” that satisfactorily established an express
congressional intent to diminish the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation. 160
The Tenth Circuit pointed out that not only was there a lack of express
textual language, but there was evidence of congressional recognition of the
Muscogee Creek Reservation. Citing the Original Allotment Agreement’s
reservation of land for tribal purposes, the court recognized that “Solem
explained that retention of lands for tribal purposes ‘strongly suggests’
continued reservation status.”161 Additionally, the absence of a “sum-certain
153. Id. at 948 (quoting Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010)).
154. Id. at 948.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)) (alteration in original)
(internal citation omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 948-49.
159. Id. at 949-50.
160. Id. at 951 (quoting Wyoming v. EPA, 849 F.3d 861, 869 (10th Cir. 2017)).
161. Id.
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payment to the Creek Nation for all—or even a portion of—its land” further
supports the continued existence of the Muscogee Creek Nation
Reservation.162
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit was not persuaded by the State of Oklahoma’s
argument that the title and governance edicts found in the congressional
acts support disestablishment. The main reason the court found those
arguments unpersuasive was because those questions, as addressed in the
congressional acts cited by the State of Oklahoma, had nothing to do with
the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation. 163 Further, the
Tenth Circuit recognized that “‘the Supreme Court has required that
specific congressional intent to diminish boundaries . . . be clearly
established’” in the congressional acts.164
2. The Second Solem Factor
When examining the contemporaneous historical evidence, the Tenth
Circuit distinguished its finding in Osage Nation from the facts of Murphy.
The court acknowledged that even though it found disestablishment in
Osage Nation based on the second factor of Solem, it did so because “the
legislative history and the negotiation process [made] clear that all the
parties at the table understood that the Osage reservation would be
disestablished by the Osage Allotment Act.” 165 Conversely, the court found
no such explicit evidence in Murphy. 166 Further, the Tenth Circuit clarified
that even if the State had proffered second factor evidence to support its
argument under the first factor of the Solem test, the court would not have
ruled in favor of disestablishment. 167 Since the first Solem factor is
dispositive, the court held that
[b]ecause no clear textual evidence shows Congress
disestablished the Creek Reservation at step one, it is enough for
us to say at step two that the “historical evidence in no way
unequivocally reveal[s] a widely held, contemporaneous

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 952 (quoting Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387,
1394-95 (10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotations omitted).
165. Id. at 954 (quoting Osage Nation v. Irby, 597 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir. 2010))
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 954 n.64.
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understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a
result of the proposed legislation.”168
3. The Third Solem Factor
The final factor of the Solem test considers evidence of federal and local
treatment of the land, as well as the demographic history of the land since
the point of alleged diminishment or disestablishment, with specific
emphasis on evidence immediately following the enactment of the relevant
laws.169 Particular attention is paid to how Congress and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs treated the land in question. 170 Importantly, Solem makes
clear that evidence from this factor is the least persuasive, allowing the
Tenth Circuit to follow the Supreme Court’s trend of “never [having] relied
solely on this third consideration to find diminishment.”171 In relation to
Oklahoma’s past assertions of jurisdiction in the Muscogee Creek Nation,
the Tenth Circuit quoted its analysis in Indian Country, U.S.A., reasserting
that despite Oklahoma’s encroachment on Creek jurisdiction,
“the past failure to challenge Oklahoma’s jurisdiction over Creek
Nation lands, or to treat them as reservation lands, [did] not
divest the federal government of its exclusive authority over
relations with the Creek Nation or negate Congress’ intent to
protect Creek tribal lands and Creek governance with respect to
those lands.”172
F. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit held that because the Solem analysis failed to prove
diminishment or disestablishment of the Muscogee Creek Nation
Reservation, the crime occurred on an § 1151(a) reservation. 173
Subsequently, Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Murphy, an
Indian accused of committing a felony in Indian Country, because the
Major Crimes Act grants exclusive jurisdiction of his case to the federal
government.174 As a result, “[t]he decision whether to prosecute Mr.
168. Id. at 959 (quoting Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1080 (2016)) (second
alteration in original).
169. Id. at 960.
170. Id. at 960-62.
171. Id. at 960 (quoting Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1081) (internal quotations omitted).
172. Id. at 964 (quoting Indian Country, U.S.A. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 974 (10th
Cir. 1987)).
173. Id. at 966.
174. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012)).
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Murphy in federal court rests with the United States” because his “state
conviction and death sentence are . . . invalid.” 175
IV. Impacts of the Murphy Decision on Criminal Jurisdiction
This section examines how the Murphy decision will impact the lives of
both Indian and non-Indian residents of the Muscogee Creek Reservation if
Murphy remains the law. The jurisdictional areas addressed generally are:
criminal, civil regulatory, and civil adjudicatory. Not every jurisdictional
statute or sub-area of jurisdiction is addressed here. This Comment is meant
to serve as an overview of the possible impacts on jurisdiction in the areas
included in the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation and is not exhaustive.
This cursory introduction, however, illuminates the minimal impacts of the
Murphy decision on the day-to-day life of Muscogee Creek Nation residents
within the 1866 boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Nation as § 1151(a)
Indian Country.
A. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Enumerated Felonies with an Indian
Defendant: Major Crimes Act – 18 U.S.C. § 1153
As a result of the Murphy decision, the federal government will have
exclusive jurisdiction over enumerated felonies involving an Indian
defendant. The statute giving exclusive jurisdiction over certain felonies
perpetrated by an Indian is 18 U.S.C. § 1153, commonly known as the
Major Crimes Act. The relevant section of the current statute is as follows:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses,
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony
under chapter 109A [sexual abuse], incest, a felony assault under
section 113, an assault against an individual who has not attained
the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and
penalties as all other persons committing any of the above
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.176
Originally enacted in 1885, the section that became the Major Crimes
Act was the final provision of the Indian Department appropriations bill for

175. Id.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. II 2014).
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that year.177 Congress passed the Major Crimes Act in direct response to Ex
parte Crow Dog178 to give the federal judiciary complete control over the
felony prosecution of Indians committing crimes in Indian Country. 179 In
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court ruled that federal law had no role in
prosecuting Indian-on-Indian crimes, and that the remedies demanded by
the processes of the tribe of the wronged party were sufficient. 180
Today, the Major Crimes Act remains one of the cardinal statutes for
determining proper criminal jurisdiction in cases involving Native
American defendants in Indian Country. If the locus of the crime is in
Indian Country, the defendant is an enrolled member of a federallyrecognized tribe, and the alleged crime is one of the enumerated felonies in
§ 1153, then federal courts have jurisdiction exclusive of the states. The
Major Crimes Act is the statute that divested the State of Oklahoma of
jurisdiction in Murphy.181
One unanswered question is whether the Major Crimes Act extinguishes
tribal jurisdiction over these enumerated felonies. 182 This question is further
complicated by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which amended the
Indian Civil Rights Act to allow tribes to expand sentencing power from
less than one year to up to three years per offense, and for a total of nine
years per criminal proceeding. 183 As a result, tribes may elect to have felony
sentencing power so long as the defendant is a person who “(1) has been
previously convicted of the same or a comparable offense by any
jurisdiction in the United States; or (2) is being prosecuted for an offense
that would be punishable by more than 1 year of imprisonment if
prosecuted by the United States or any of the States.”184 Tribes must also
“[provide] indigent defense counsel and a law-trained and bar-licensed
judge, make publicly available their laws and rules, and try the defendant in
a court of record.”185 The Muscogee Creek Nation codified the sentencing
expansion in 2010.186

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.
109 U.S. 556 (1883).
COHEN, supra note 5, § 9.02[2][a], at 749-50.
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 406-07.
Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 966 (10th Cir. 2017).
COHEN, supra note 5, § 9.04, at 767-69.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
Id. § 1302(b).
COHEN, supra note 5, § 9.09, at 779.
MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION CODE § 10-210 (2010).
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B. Almost Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction over Non-Indian Defendants and
Concurrent Federal/Tribal Jurisdiction over Indian Defendants Against
Non-Indian Plaintiffs: Indian Country Crimes Act
Because of Murphy, the Muscogee Creek Nation Tribal Court will now
have concurrent jurisdiction over all unenumerated offenses—those not
under the Major Crimes Act—involving Indian defendants against nonIndian plaintiffs on the reservation. The Indian Country Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152, applies the “general laws of the United States” to all § 1151
Indian Country, minus three exceptions. 187 The first exception is that the
Indian Country Crimes Act shall not apply to crimes “committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian.” 188 The second
exception is that the Indian Country Crimes Act does not apply to Indians
already punished by their tribe for the same offense. 189 The final exception
is that the Indian Country Crimes Act does not apply if the tribe reserved
jurisdiction by treaty.190
As a result, all crimes committed by or against an Indian in which one
party is a non-Indian can be prosecuted by the federal government under
this statute, “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.” 191 Within §
1151 Indian Country, the only other sovereigns with the power to prosecute
criminal cases involving one or more Indian parties are tribes, meaning
tribes may have concurrent jurisdiction for some types of cases. But,
because of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, tribal courts do not have
jurisdiction over non-Indians for most crimes.192 Subsequently, the Indian
Country Crimes Act essentially grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
government for most offenses committed in § 1151 Indian Country
involving at least one non-Indian party. Additionally, § 1152 also provides
the federal government with concurrent jurisdiction alongside tribal
governments over crimes against non-Indians by an Indian defendant. 193
At present, the only exception to the Oliphant decision that expands
tribal concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants is the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA 2013”). 194 Under
VAWA 2013, tribes may now elect to prosecute non-Indian perpetrators for
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
See specifically 25 U.S.C.A. § 1304 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-93).
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domestic violence, dating violence, or criminal violations of protective
orders so long as the defendant “[has] ties to the Indian tribe.”195 In order to
have sufficient ties to a tribe, the defendant must:
(i) reside[] in the Indian country of the participating tribe;
(ii) [be] employed in the Indian country of the participating
tribe; or
(iii) [be] a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of—
(I) a member of the participating tribe; or
(II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the
participating tribe.196
Supporting increased comity between the federal and tribal courts on this
issue, the Supreme Court has also held that tribal court convictions can be
used to establish habitual offender status in federal court without violating
the Sixth Amendment. 197 The Muscogee Creek Nation adopted the VAWA
2013 expansion in 2016.198
C. Exclusive Jurisdiction for Indian on Indian Unenumerated Felonies and
Misdemeanors
As first recognized under Talton v. Mayes, tribes have the inherent
sovereign power to prosecute tribal offenders. 199 Nevertheless, after Duro v.
Reina, where the Court held that tribes lacked the “inherent or sovereign
authority to prosecute . . . ‘nonmember Indian[s],’” 200 Congress amended
25 U.S.C. § 1301 to delineate that tribes have the “inherent power . . . ,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”201 This legislation is known colloquially as “the Duro-fix.” 202
Thus, since the Court in Lara held that “Congress does possess the
constitutional power to lift the restrictions on the tribes’ criminal

195. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B), (c).
196. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
197. See United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
198. MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION CODE ANN. § 16-038 (2016).
199. 163 U.S. 376 (1896); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
200. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (emphasis omitted) (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 682
(1990)).
201. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
202. COHEN, supra note 5, § 9.04, at 766.
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jurisdiction,”203 tribes once again have full criminal jurisdiction for crimes
by Indians against another Indian, so long as tribal jurisdiction is not
precluded by the Major Crimes Act. Because the Muscogee Creek Nation
already properly had jurisdiction over this type of crime, Murphy will only
expand the tribe’s jurisdictional area.
D. Exclusive Jurisdiction over Non-Indian on Non-Indian Crimes in Indian
Country
Due to the line of cases following United States v. McBratney, states
have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes in which all parties are nonIndians.204 Beginning with McBratney, the Supreme Court held that neither
tribes nor the federal government have an interest in crimes involving only
non-Indians that occur in Indian Country. 205 The latter two cases, Ray and
Draper, merely extend the premise of McBratney to all states, regardless of
the terms of their territorial governmental structure or enabling act. 206
Murphy will not change this jurisdiction whatsoever.
E. Criminal Jurisdiction and Murphy
If Murphy is upheld by the United States Supreme Court, the biggest
impact to criminal jurisdiction will be that all cases involving an Indian
victim or defendant will be heard in either tribal or federal court. This
means that non-Indians will likely be tried in federal court if they commit a
crime in Indian Country against an Indian. However, no crimes between
solely non-Indians will be heard in tribal court.
As a result of increased prosecutorial responsibility, the Muscogee Creek
Nation will have to absorb an increase in criminal prosecutions, as will the
Eastern District of Oklahoma. Because the Muscogee Creek Nation has
taken the VAWA 2013 special criminal jurisdiction expansion, the Tribe
will be able to prosecute some non-Indians for domestic violence, dating
violence, or for criminal violations of protective orders. By adopting the
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 sentencing expansion, the Muscogee
Creek Nation will be able to give short felony sentences, as well.
For law enforcement agencies, expansion of already existing crossdeputization agreements between local, state, and Muscogee Creek Nation
law enforcement will ensure efficient policing continues on the Muscogee
203. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
204. See generally United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Draper v. United
States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
205. McBratney, 104 U.S. at 621-22, 624.
206. Draper, 164 U.S. at 241-42, 246-47; Ray, 326 U.S. at 499.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

382

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Creek Nation Reservation. Cross-deputization agreements allow
participating law enforcement agencies to arrest and transfer individuals
who could be under the jurisdiction of any signatory agency without the
fear of constitutional rights violations.207 As of January 2018, the Muscogee
Creek Nation already had cross-deputization agreements with several
municipal, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies,
including the Bureau of Indian Affairs Office of Law Enforcement Services
and Security (BIA OLESS),208 Muskogee County,209 and the City of
Tulsa,210 to name a few.211
Through cross-deputization agreements and increased inter-agency
cooperation, there is a reasonable likelihood that state policing will suffer
little to no negative impact, even in densely-populated areas like Tulsa.
This conclusion is supported by evidence from cross-deputization
agreements that are already in operation. 212
V. Impacts on Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction
A. General Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction
First recognized in Worcester v. Georgia, tribes have inherent sovereign
power to legislate and adjudicate civil conduct over not only their own
members, but, unless otherwise limited by the federal government, also
nonmember Indians and non-Indians who enter their jurisdictions. 213
Federal restrictions on Indian civil jurisdiction most commonly arise out of
207. See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 6.05, at 588-94.
208. Muscogee Creek Nation Tribal Resolution 12-065 (May 19, 2012), https://www.
sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/89678.pdf.
209. Intergovernmental Cross-Deputization Agreement Between the United States, the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the County of Muskogee (Apr. 15, 2002), https://www.
sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/57021.pdf (addendum).
210. Intergovernmental Cross-Deputization Agreement Between the United States, the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the City of Tulsa (Jan. 18, 2006), https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/filelog/63941.pdf.
211. Some compacts may have lapsed or changed by the time of publication.
212. Nicole Marshall, Common Ground Found by Officers, TULSA WORLD (Dec. 12,
2010),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/common-ground-found-by-officers/article_
72938327-38e9-580f-9ebc-84aaa5a6782e.html; D.E. Smoot, County and Creek Law
Enforcers Approve Agreement, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX (Jun. 11, 2017), http://www.muskogee
phoenix.com/news/county-and-creek-law-enforcers-approve-agreement/article_4d5539fe69ca-586b-9411-a1a34266a7be.html.
213. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01[2][c], [f], at 216-18, 222;
id. § 4.02[1], at 222-23; id. § 4.02[3], at 226-42; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959).
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statutory or treaty abrogation. 214 Within the last forty years, the Supreme
Court began to limit tribal sovereign authority pertaining to civil
jurisdiction, primarily through the landmark case Montana v. United
States.215
In Montana, the Supreme Court held that absent one of two exceptions,
tribes do not have the authority to regulate non-Indian conduct on nonIndian-owned fee land within reservations. 216 These two exceptions are
known as the Montana 1 and Montana 2 exceptions. First, “[a] tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements.”217 Second, “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”218 These two exceptions are the primary means by which Indian civil
legislative authority applies to non-Indians on non-Indian-owned fee land in
§ 1151(a) Indian Country, and would be the only means by which nonIndians would feel an increase in Muscogee Creek Nation authority if
Murphy is upheld. Otherwise, the Muscogee Creek Nation already has
inherent regulatory authority over restricted or trust lands in its reservation.
Therefore, the only expansion would be to non-Indian owned land, which is
restricted by the Montana line of cases.
The cases following Montana, including Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley219 and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation,220 indicate a preference for further limiting the Montana 2
exception. Brendale limited the Yakima’s authority to regulate zoning in
areas of its reservation that the Court considered “open” or heavily
populated by non-Indians while allowing tribal regulation in “closed” areas
that had retained their “Indian character.”221 In Atkinson Trading Co., the
Supreme Court held that non-Indian owned fee lands included in an
addition to the Diné (Navajo) reservation after their purchase by non214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02[1]-[2], at 222-26.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 566.
532 U.S. 645 (2001).
492 U.S. 408 (1989).
Id. at 437.
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Indians were not under the civil regulatory jurisdiction of the tribe. 222 As a
result, increases in regulatory authority granted to the Muscogee Creek
Nation over non-Indian-owned fee land by the recognition of its reservation
will typically be limited to the authority allowed by the Montana
exceptions.
B. Environmental Regulation and Murphy
While the State of Oklahoma claims in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari
that the Tenth Circuit’s decision “open[s] up a Pandora’s Box of questions
regarding the State’s regulatory power,” several of these jurisdictional
questions are simple matters of statutory application. 223 One of the
questions proffered by the State was whether the State of Oklahoma will
retain enforcement authority under Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) statutes.224 This question, however, has already been answered by
Congress in favor of the State, and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Murphy
does not impact the enforcement of the governing statute.
After Congress passed section 10211 as a rider on a transportation bill,
the EPA is required to grant the State of Oklahoma enforcement authority
over tribal lands if the State has an approved regulatory program for that
statute and if the State requests such authority. 225 Further, Oklahoma tribes
that qualify to participate in the EPA’s Tribes As States (“TAS”) program
cannot do so without the State of Oklahoma’s permission. 226 If the State
does approve the tribe’s application for TAS status, the tribe seeking such
authority must also agree to enter into an environmental regulation compact
agreement with the State.227
As a result, there are no circumstances in which the State of Oklahoma
would lose this type of regulatory authority to the EPA without a clear act
of Congress or the elimination of section 10211. Congress has expressly
abrogated the rights of Oklahoma tribes to pursue TAS status without state
consent and without any conditional language pertaining to the type of
Indian Country the tribe possessed. Therefore, the type of Indian Country

222. 532 U.S. at 647.
223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Royal v. Murphy, No. 17-1107 (U.S. Feb. 6,
2018), 2018 WL 776368.
224. Id.
225. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10211, 119 Stat. 1144, 1937 (2005).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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possessed by the Muscogee Creek Nation has no impact on Oklahoma’s
EPA statutory enforcement authority.
VI. Impacts on Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
As discussed previously, Indian tribes have the inherent authority to
regulate and adjudicate civil matters within their lands so long as that power
has not been limited or divested. 228 On the reservation, the Muscogee Creek
Nation will have exclusive civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. Williams v. Lee is
the case that controls for conflicts in which an Indian defendant is sued by a
non-Indian over a civil cause of action arising in Indian Country. 229
Williams, a civil jurisdiction case involving a licensed Indian trader’s
dispute with an individual tribal member on the Navajo reservation, set the
foundational civil law standard that “absent [a] governing [a]ct[] of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringe[s]
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”230 Williams sets the most liberal standard for determining whether
tribal civil jurisdiction is proper because state jurisdiction over transactions
on the reservation between Indians and non-Indians would impede tribal
self-governance. 231 Subsequently, the Court generally recognizes that a tribe
has inherent jurisdiction over transactions between members and nonmembers in its Indian Country.232
Tribal civil adjudicatory authority is, however, restricted. After Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, the Montana test also applies to determine whether tribal
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction exists for incidents arising from non-Indian
conduct on non-Indian-owned fee land.233 In Strate, the Court held that the
right-of-way for the highway that ran through the reservation was not under
tribal governance for purposes of civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. 234 The
Court reasoned that the Tribe did not have a valid adjudicatory concern,
“even though careless driving on a reservation highway threatens the health
and safety of tribal members”; therefore, state jurisdiction sufficed. 235

228. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.01[2][c], [f], at 216-18, 222; id. § 4.02[1], at 222-23; id. §
4.02[3], at 226-42.
229. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
230. Id. at 219-20.
231. Id.
232. COHEN, supra note 5, § 6.01[1], at 489.
233. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
234. Id. at 453.
235. COHEN, supra note 5, § 4.02[3][c], at 236.
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Another important outcome of Strate is an additional implicit divestiture
restriction on tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction arising from the Montana
test. The Court held that “[a]s to nonmembers, . . . a tribe’s adjudicative
jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.” 236 Subsequently,
tribes are only able to adjudicate disputes over non-Indians that they also
have regulatory authority over, unless an act of Congress has expanded
their authority.
After Strate, civil conflicts exclusively between non-Indians will
generally not fall under Muscogee Creek Nation jurisdiction as long as the
locus of the conflict occurs on non-Indian-owned land, or if the non-Indian
party has not consented to tribal jurisdiction. This outcome is supported by
the result in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., in
which the Supreme Court held that under the Montana test, tribes did not
have jurisdiction over the on-reservation sale of non-Indian-owned fee land
between non-Indian parties.237 Thus, the expansion of Muscogee Creek
Nation tribal jurisdiction over civil adjudicatory disputes will be limited to
instances in which the non-tribal member has consented to jurisdiction,
situations that trigger a Montana exception, or instances when federal law
mandates tribal jurisdiction.
A. Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Murphy
Civil adjudicatory jurisdiction will be the area of the greatest tribal
jurisdictional expansion if Murphy is upheld because the Montana 1
exception governs consensual commercial relationships between tribes or
tribal members and non-members. Because of Strate, civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over civil suits involving only non-members arising from
incidents on non-member-owned land will not fall under tribal jurisdiction.
The Muscogee Creek Nation, however, will have jurisdiction over
potentially all commercial transactions between non-Indians and Indians on
the reservation.
Civil adjudicatory jurisdiction will also expand if Murphy is upheld
because of the changes to Indian Child Welfare Act jurisdiction that
occurred when the Muscogee Creek Nation was recognized as a
reservation. Per the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), Muscogee Creek
Nation Tribal Court is now the court of original jurisdiction for all ICWA
claims arising on the reservation per § 1911. 238 As a result, all child welfare
236. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.
237. 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008).
238. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012).
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cases involving Indian children living within the boundaries of the
Muscogee Creek Nation will be heard in Muscogee Creek Nation Tribal
Court unless existing federal law places jurisdiction with the state. 239
B. Federal Question and Diversity Jurisdiction: National Farmers Union
Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe & Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante
Non-Indian defendants in the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation who
wish to contest the validity of tribal jurisdiction in a civil adjudicatory case
will most likely be subject to the tribal exhaustion doctrine. 240 National
Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe241 is the governing case for
determining whether a civil case is properly before a tribal court. In
National Farmers Union, the Court declared that “[t]he question whether an
Indian tribe retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to
submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered
by reference to federal law and is a ‘federal question’ under [28 U.S.C.] §
1331.”242 Nevertheless, even though federal courts may adjudicate this
jurisdictional question, National Farmers Union requires that non-Indian
defendants must almost always first exhaust tribal remedies before getting
into federal court on federal question jurisdiction. 243 The tribal exhaustion
doctrine does not apply to bad faith assertions of jurisdiction, instances
where there is clearly no tribal jurisdiction, or where it is futile due to the
“‘lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.’” 244
The Supreme Court extended the National Farmers Union analysis to
diversity jurisdiction in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante.245 Citing
National Farmers Union, the Court required exhaustion of tribal remedies
before allowing the question of tribal jurisdictional validity to be heard in
federal district court.246 Once again, its reasoning was that “proper respect
for tribal legal institutions requires that they be given a ‘full opportunity’ to
consider the issues before them and ‘to rectify any errors’” before assuming
federal jurisdiction, in keeping with “[the] federal policy of promoting
tribal self-government.”247
239. Id.
240. For other possible exceptions, see COHEN, supra note 5, § 7.04[3], at 630-36.
241. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
242. Id. at 852.
243. Id. at 856-57.
244. COHEN, supra note 5, § 7.04[3], at 631 (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985)).
245. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
246. Id. at 16.
247. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857).
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The one limited instance in which state jurisdiction may be proper is
characterized in Nevada v. Hicks. 248 After Hicks, tribes may not assert
jurisdiction over civil adjudicatory claims against state law enforcement
officers who enter tribal land to execute a search warrant on a tribal
member suspected of violating state law while off the reservation. 249 This
case could be limited entirely to its facts, as the Court emphasized that
“[s]elf-government and internal relations are not directly at issue here,
since the issue is whether the Tribe’s law will apply, not to their own
members, but to a narrow category of outsiders,” including non-tribal law
enforcement officers.250
The jurisdictional expansion caused by the Murphy decision will increase
the possibility of appearing in tribal court, and, as a result, the possibility
that a client will encounter the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. Still, even if
it does apply to a given civil action, there are numerous exceptions to the
doctrine, particularly through contractual language. 251 Thus, it is quite
possible for a client to reach federal court on a jurisdictional question
without having to exhaust tribal remedies.
VII. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Royal properly recognizes the
Muscogee Creek Nation as an intact reservation with § 1151(a) jurisdiction
based on governing Supreme Court jurisprudence. Recognizing the
Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation as § 1151(a) jurisdiction primarily
expands Muscogee Creek Nation jurisdiction over Indian residents of the
Reservation while only automatically increasing its jurisdiction over nonIndians in limited circumstances, such as VAWA 2013 criminal cases and
some civil regulatory capacities. Subsequently, non-Indian residents of the
Muscogee Creek Nation will see minimal, if any, change in jurisdiction that
impacts their day-to-day lives without their consent.
The Tenth Circuit denied en banc review of Murphy on November 9th,
2017.252 Chief Judge Tymkovich issued a concurrence along with the
denial, noting first that an “en banc court would necessarily reach the same
result, since Supreme Court precedent precludes any other outcome.” 253 As
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

533 U.S. 353 (2001).
Id. at 364.
Id. at 371.
See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 7.04[3], at 630-36.
Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 966.
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he plainly states, the primary purpose of his concurrence is to encourage
Supreme Court review. 254 The State, on behalf of the warden, filed its
petition for writ of certiorari on February 6, 2018.255 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari on May 21, 2018.

254. Id. at 966-68.
255. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 223.
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